Securing Virtual Architecture of Smartphones based on Network Function Virtualization
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.56294/mr202337Keywords:
Network Function Virtualization, Hypervisor, Specter, DoS, SmartphonesAbstract
One of the most difficult parts of Network Function Virtualization (NFV) installations is security. The NFV environment is a large-scale, software-driven one with a variety of components. Network topologies and traffic flows are continuously and managed to change. Such complexity necessitates a comprehensive security framework that permits automatic and to manage changeable network conditions, a quick response is required with the least amount of manual involvement. This paper introduced many solutions for securing the NFV environment from attacks such as (Specter and DoS) that attack parts of this architecture based on some experiments. Applied NFV on an operating system of smartphones (Android). We tested some attacks on the device and then on some of the layers in the architecture. We obtain new and obvious results, by comparison, to traditional and updated NFV architecture. Also, update the NFV architecture using vCenter/ESX and Hyper-V being two important terms in security After adding the necessary algorithms to protect the NFV architecture, we noticed about 128 hours to hack a 1,4 megabyte (WinRAR) file, while the same file and the same size needed 126 hours to reach the root without the algorithms used to protect the architecture.
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Copyright (c) 2023 Hayder A. Nahi, Mustafa Asaad Hasan, Ali Hussein Lazem, Mohammed Ayad Alkhafaji (Author)

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